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NOTES.
CORPORATION-FORFEITURE OF CHARTER BY No.N-USRM.-
Mr. Justice Story, in the case of Terrelt v. Taylor, 9 Cranch
43 (i815), pronounced the doctrine that "a private corpora-
tion created by the legislature may lose its franchises by a
misuser, or a non-user of them, and they may be resumed by
the government under a judicial judgment upon a quo warrantto
to ascertain and enforce the forfeiture." This principle, af-
firmed years afterward by the same learned jurist in Mumma
v. Potomac Co., 8 Peters 287, has been recognized and followed
in all jurisdictions, a corporation by its very nature being
restricted to certain standards of duty and specified lines of
procedure, in derogation of which it forfeits its right to
existence. Presumably corporations are created by the
legislature and sanctioned by the courts for purposes of
public benefit; their charters are drawn with this object in
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view; and when they become guilty of any act seriously
disqualifying them for such service, they become not only
no longer useful, but often actively dangerous entities.
Accordingly an insurance company,' or a bank,, may be
restrained from further carrying on business upon grounds of
insolvency; or. in the case of a bank, because of a refusal
to redeem its issues in species where such refusal was not
shown to be the result of temporary inevitable necessity.4
Where, however, insolvency is the reason assigned, it must
be shown to be of a permanent character; a mere temporary
insolvent condition at any particular time is hardly sufficient
cause for so drastic a remedy.s Logically, then, where an
industrial corporation suspends operations, financial inability
to proceed will be held no excuse,6 though a misfortune, due
to a bona fide accident or mistake, may sometimes serve as a
sufficient answer, if a substantial performance with the terms
of the charter is shown.
The courts, as a rule, show the utmost discretion in the
exercise of this function, particularly where the dereliction
is one of omission rather than of commission. The non-user
complained of must be of the essence of the contract between
the corporation and the state." A wrongful intention must be
shown, such an abuse of the confidence of the state, according
to a New York case,9 as would justify the displacement of a
trustee; though a corrupt or bad motive is not essential;
it is enough if the duties be knowingly or designedly omitted.o
Nor will the courts permit any of these defections to be taken
advantage of in a collateral proceeding, where it has not
already been adjudged a ground of forfeiture. There must be
a trial and judgment upon the issue before a franchise will
be removed.-
Even where there is an express provision in a legislative
act, which the corporation has transgressed, it will not thereby
be ipso facto dissolved; no such dissolution can take place
without the decree of a court of competent jurisdiction."a
How far a mere partial non-user of the duties and privileges
:Chicago Life I:s. Co. v. Needles, ix 3 N. S. 574 (1884).
'State v. Real Estate Bank, S Ark. 59S (z843).
sPeople v. Dubois, 18 11. 334.
'State v. Real Estate Bank_, supra.
sPeople v. Hudson Bank, 6 Cow. (N. Y.) 217.
IPeople v. Plaintfirld Ave. Gravel Road Co.. zoS Mich. 9.
-People v. Kingston etc. Turnpike Co.. 23 Wend. (N. Y.) at p. 210.
"Corn. v. Commercial Bank, 28 Pa. 383 (1857).
oProple v. Atlantic Ame. R. R. Co., 125 N. Y. S13.
:-People v. Kingston etc. Turnpike Co.. supra.
,Dyer v. W1alker. 40 Pa. 1i 7 (1861).
,.lSeper v. Goodwin. 67 M is. 577.
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conferred will operate as a cause for dissolution is a matter
of some uncertainty, varying more or less with the nature of
the business to be carried on.
A railroad, which suspends operation for the space of a
year, will be dissolved, under a statute, at the instance of
the attorney-general.1s And where a railroad fails to con-
struct its entire line as required by law, but condemns private
property and builds only such part of its system as will be
beneficial to certain large stockholders, its franchise may be
cancelled."4
On the other hand, an insurance company which refuses
to take extra-hazardous risks,- a manufacturing company
which produces only one of the several articles permitted in
its charter,,o or a college one of whose departments has fallen
into partial decay merely because of refusal of students to
enter the course, have been held not guilty of wilful non-user.'
6
In all of these cases, however, an intention was shown
substantially to perform the terms of the charter; apparently
it is the practice of the court to examine in each case the mo-
tive, as well as the cause, of the dereliction. It is doubtless
largely upon this basis that the Supreme Court of Missouri
gave its decision in State on inf. Hadley, Atty-Gen. v. Delmar
Jockey Club, 98 S. W. 539. The corporation, in this case,
had obtained a franchise authorizing it to promote agri-
culture, establish and maintain suitable fair-grounds, and
give and conduct races and public exhibitions of agricultural
products and stock. The fair-grounds were established, but
for five years they were never used for anything except race-
meets, and the court, on the information of the attorney-
general, decreed the charter forfeit, on the ground that the
main purpose and object of incorporating the club had been
to promote the study of agriculture, and that this purpose was
in no way fulfilled by merely conducting a series of horse-
races.
POLICE POWER OF TIE LEGISLATURE-REGULATION OF
HEIGHT OF BVILDINGS.-Tle power of the legislature to
interfere with what has always been claimed as the inherent
rights of property-owners is universally admitted wherever
the safety or health of a large portion of the community is
13.5tate v. .llin'esota Central R. R., 36 Minn. 246.
4.L(te v. llacton etc. R. R., 40 Ohio 504.
%Statc v. L'rban a Ins. Co., x4 Ohio 6.
'q" tton .llills Co. v. Burns, 114 N. Car. 353.
S-.S:atC v. Farmwrs* College. 32 Ohio 487 (1877).
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involved. For over a centurvz it has not been denied that
either a state or a municipal assembly can pass an ordinance
restricting, or prohibitings the building of frame structures
within certain prescribed "fire limits" of a town, and legis-
lation has been held constitutional which excludes from certain
thickly-populated districts any building used as a slaughter-
house, or for other noxious or offensive trade.4
The reasons for such provisions are too obvious to require
comment. But a more serious difficulty arises, and a finer
line of demarcation must be drawn, when it is attempted to
increase the total amount of space, light and air in a city or
town by restrictions as to the size and location of buildings.
An old Pennsylvania cases holds a statute constitutional
prohibiting the erection of any new dwelling-house on a
street, alley or court of a less width than twenty feet, and
the start thus given was afterwards taken advantage of in
the same state when the question arose as to whether it was
competent to prescribe the distance from the curb to .the
building-line. An ordinance providing for such a measure-
ment was held constitutional, where it allowed due compensa-
tion to property-owners for the land appropriated;6 and it
was apparently only because of the absence of this latter
provision that the Supreme Court of Missouri failed to sanction
a similar enactment.?
Altogether, it appears to be clearly established that a
municipal corporation may decree any width for its streets,
and restrict the building line accordingly. Where, however,
the question presents itself not as to the location, but as to
the height, of the building, authorities are fewer and more
conflicting. An Act of the New York Assembly limiting the
height of tenement-houses to eighty feet on streets and
avenues exceeding sixty feet in width was held constitu-
tional,$ the motive underlying it being interpreted by the
court to be a desire to minimize the danger in case of fire.
The Massachusetts legislature have gone further, and
passed a statute limiting the height of buildings erected near
Copley Square, Boston, the obvious intention being to increase
the total amount of light and air in the district; and this was
tRepublica v. Duqtt. 2 Yeates (Pa.) 492 (1rf9).
,City of Salem v. aaynes, 123 Mass. 372 (1877); Ex Pare Fiske,
72 Cal. 125 (1887).
sKiingler v. Bickel, it7 Pa. 326 (887).
4Inhabitants of Watertown v. Mayo. 109 Mass. 315 (872).
slit re Perry's Court, io Phila. 27 H (1873).
6City v. Linnard, 97 Pa. 242 (i88); in re Chestnut St.. rIS Pa. 593
(1888).
?St. Louis v. tliU, i16 Mo. 527 (1893).
WProple v. D'Onch, x: N. Y. 359 (1888).
sanctioned by the court.* That the action was still for pur-
poses of health rather than of beauty, is, however, proved by
the refusal of the same court to give force to a regulation of
park commissioners, passed by virtue of powers granted them
by a legislative enactment, prohibiting the erection of signs
within view of pedestrians in the park.-° Here again there was
no compensation provided for the property rights infringed-
and indeed it is difficult to see how there could be-and the
court intimated that a regulation including this provision,
and properly restraining the erection of signs, might be
constitutional.
The recent action of the same court in the case of Welch
v. Swasey et al., 79 N. E. Rep. 74S (1907), is particularly
interesting in the light of this latter dictum. The regulation
contested in the case was passed by commissioners, acting
under legislative powers, prohibiting the erection of a building
in a residence district in Boston of a greater height than
eighty feet unless its width on each street on which it stands
be at least one-half its height. The Supreme Judicial Court
held that the regulation and the statute permitting it were
constitutional, and while not passed for purely aesthetic
reasons, would be none the less so, under the circumstances,
if they were. This, again, is nothing more than an expression
of opinion, but it is of so strong a character as to show a
tendency toward upholding legislation looking toward the
beautifying of our cities.
DUTY OF CARRIERS IN DISCHARGING PASSENGERS.-A
case of considerable practical importance has been lately
decided by the Court of Appeals of Kentucky. In Louisville
City Ry. Co. v. Hudgins (98 S. W. 275) a passenger on plain-
tiff's car had alighted and walked behind the car to cross a
parallel track, of the plaintiff's when she was struck by a car
on the parallel track, and sued for injuries caused thereby.
The court below charged the jury that-
"If you shall believe from the evidence that at that time she failed
to exercise ordinary care for her own safety, and, by reason of such
failure she helped to cause or bring about the injury of which she com-
plains, and that she would not have been injured but for her failure in
that respect, if any there was, then the law is for the defendant, and
you should so find unless you shall believe from the evidence that the
employees of the defendant on its east-bound car could have seen the
sAtty-General v. Williams, 174 Mass. 476 (i899).
-oCommomecalth v. Boston Adv. Co., 788 Mass. 348 (T905).
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plaintiff by the exercise of ordinary care when she came in peril from
the car, and, by the exercise of ordinary care, could have prevented
the injury which the plaintiff alleges she sustained; if they could, then
the law is for the plaintiff, and you should so find."
and this was the ground of appeal. The decision was affirmed,
the court saying that-
"It was of course the duty of appellce, when she started to cross the
tracks, to exercise ordinary care for her own safety, but, although she
failed to do this and her failure may have contributed to such an extent
to bring about the injury of which she complains, that it would not
have happened except for her failure to exercise this degree of care,
will not relieve the appellant of liability if the persons in charge of
the car that struck her could, by the exercise of ordinary care, have
discovered the peril appellee was in, and, by the exercise of ordinary
care, have prevented the injury to her.
It is doubtful if such a case would go the same way in
Pennsylvania, and in one case where the facts were practi-
cally identical the court non-suited the plaintiff on the
ground of contributory negligence. The alighting passenger
did not stop before crossing the parallel track, and the evi-
dence was that he looked straight ahead and that he could
have seen the approaching car had he looked, in which event
he might have stepped in between the two cars and been
safe. As a matter of fact exactly the same thing could be
said about the passenger in the former case. The court says:
"Though the stop, look and listen rule does not apply to city rail-
roads, yet it is plain that a man must look where he is going,"
and the non-suit was affirmed.
The difference which, it is submitted, plainly exists in fact
if not in the words used in the respective charges of the
courts may be explained perhaps by the fact that in Ken-
tucky the doctrine of the last clear chance exists and in
Pennsylvania it is not recognized at all.
The Kentucky court says:
"When a car has been stopped at the usual place for discharging
passengers, it is the duty of those in charge of an approaching car on
the other track to have it under such control that it may be stopped at
a moment's notice, so that persons who have alighted may cross the
track safely."
In other words, the car must be so carefully run that the
railroad may be able to avert an accident even though a
passenger may be careless; but no such duty apparently rests
on the trolley company in Pennsylvania.
In the case of steam railroads when a passenger injured
at one of the railroad's platforms where he has of course a
perfect right to cross the track, the Pennsylvania courts seem
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to put a greater duty of care on the railroad. This may be
explained by the fact that in the case of a trolley company it
has no control over the crossings, while a railroad has com-
plete control over such platforms as the ones in question;
and further by the fact that railroad companies have cer-
tain rules not enforced by a trolley company which a pas-
senger may rely upon. In Bells v. Lehigh Val. R. R., 19r
Pa. 575, a passenger was struck by a train while crossing the
tracks over the regular platform to get to his own train
standing at the station. The train which struck him was
run past the station in violation of a well-known rule of the
company forbidding one train to approach when another
was stopping at the station. The court held a passenger
could properly rely on such a rule and need not stop, look
and listen to avoid being guilty of contributory negligence,
though here as always he must use reasonable care.
A former Pennsylvania case, Pennsylvania R. R. v. White,
88 Pa. 327, and the United States Court's case of Warner v.
B. & 0. R. R. in 168 U. S. 339, seem to be in perfect accord
with the first Pennsylvania case.
While it may be difficult to cite any definite words in the
steam railroad case which can be said to put a lighter duty
of care on the passenger, who must in both cases use
"reasonable care," yet it is quite evident that as a physical
fact more care is required of a passenger in the trolley case
than in the railroad case, and that the court will be more
inclined to take the former case away from the jury on the
ground that contributory negligence exists.
